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Part of a wider project on how the Vietnam War (1945-1975) is remembered 
by three key collectives, Vietnamese communists, Vietnamese Americans and 
the United States, this article focuses primarily on the latter. Using the theory 
of cultural trauma as its framework, this is a study in trauma and collective 
memory, its impact and the social processes through which such memory is 
constructed and maintained. The central point is that collective memory is an 
active agent in explaining why individuals and collectivities act as they do. It 
is argued that collective memory is represented and reproduced in narrative 
form through various means, such as oral telling, literature, music, drama, 
film, monuments, museum installations and commemorative events. Through 
such media and related ritual practices, the stories and myths that congeal as 
collective memory serve as a foundation upon which collective identity rests. 
The defeat in Vietnam continues to haunt American collective memory and 
has yet to be reduced to history. 
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Introduction
There were many sides to what Americans call the Vietnam War. In a wider project, 
we look at this conflict through the lens of cultural trauma and its narrative represen-
tation on the part of the three chief belligerents: the Vietnamese communists, those 
“South” Vietnamese from the former Republic of Vietnam who fled the country and 
now live in America, and the United States. In this article we will concentrate atten-
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tion on the latter, calling upon the two others primarily to illustrate by way of con-
trast how Americans remember the war. We are aware that identifying these three is 
a simplification as it overshadows differences in ideology, religion, ethnicity, and 
class. We use them reluctantly and tentatively because they have become common 
parlance, at least for the English speaking audience. Even using the term “Vietnam” 
can be problematic for some, as it stems from a colonial vocabulary but this too has 
become the established term. The “Vietnam War” is no different, as the war under-
stood from the point of view of the Vietnamese communists had a different name: the 
American War or the War of Resistance against the American Imperialists. With this 
in mind, we will try to remain consistent in terminology while referring to the gene-
ral violent confrontation between opposing forces that began in earnest at the end of 
the Second World War and for some still continues even to this day (Nguyen, 2016b). 
This is a study of how this violent conflict and the suffering it entailed is un-
derstood and remembered collectively in American society. It is thus a study in 
trauma and collective memory, its impact, and the social processes through which 
such memory is created, constructed and maintained. As with all memory, collec-
tive memory is represented and reproduced in narrative form through various means 
such as oral telling, literature, music, drama, film, the graphic arts, monuments, 
memorials, museum installations and commemorative events such as anniversa-
ries and holidays. Through such media and related ritual practices, the stories and 
myths that congeal as collective memory serve as a foundation upon which col-
lective identity rests. In the case of nations, there is no single collective memo-
ry; rather, there are many voices that over time achieve some cohesive clarity. In 
this regard, one can distinguish official collective memory from popular memory 
(sometimes called “cultural memory”), where different interpretations of the past 
confront one another (Misztal, 2003). This is the primary level of analysis in this 
article. Individual memory and the collective memory of various groups are impor-
tant of course, as they contribute to collective memory, in some cases offering a 
counter to official versions. For example, individually and collectively Vietnamese 
Americans have made various attempts to be included in official American com-
memorative ceremonies (for example, Veterans Day and Memorial Day parades), 
especially in local communities where they are a dominant presence. The published 
memoirs of former military officers and ordinary soldiers have also been an impor-
tant resource in keeping contested memories vibrant in both the United States and 
Vietnam. Antiwar activist and politician Tom Hayden, who infamously traveled to 
Hanoi in the midst of the war, has sought in a recently written memoir to counter 
the downplaying of the antiwar movement in official memorializations.1 As these 
1 For example, Hayden (2017: 8 ff) recounts meeting with those designing an online history of 
the war to show the role of antiwar activists in the constructing of these histories.
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examples reveal, when publicly expressed individual memories can be important 
vehicles in both supporting and countering official collective memory. 
While this is not an historical account of the war, it does build upon what is a 
very impressive historiography (for example Fitzgerald, 1972; Herring, 1993, 2001; 
Karnow, 1983; Moyar, 2006; Young, 1991). In order to provide a coherent account 
of how the Vietnam conflict is remembered we distinguish several arenas of memo-
ry, the social spaces where the various narratives which form collective memory in-
teract. The broad academic sphere which included historiography is but one of these 
arenas. In addition we will designate three other arenas where the discourses around 
the Vietnam War influence the understanding of the war and how it is remembered: 
the political, popular culture (including mass media and the arts), and the commu-
nity, where individual biography and generational experience are important factors. 
As with all such heuristic differentiations there is no definitive boundary between 
them and overlap occurs, such as for example between the academic debate and po-
litical/policy discussions of the war. It is also the case that these arenas are differ-
ently composed and significant with reference to our three protagonists. Exiled Vi-
etnamese for example have been participating in some commemorative events, but 
their ability to influence the way mainstream Americans and Vietnamese remember 
the war has been very limited. We may begin with a discussion of our theoretical 
frame and key concepts and then offer a very brief summary of the war before turn-
ing to the arenas within which that memory is articulated and transmitted. 
Cultural Trauma, Collective Memory and Collective Identity
Cultural trauma provides the guiding interpretative framework for our analysis. A 
cultural trauma is a discursive response to a tear in the social fabric, occurring when 
the foundations of established collective identity are shaken by one or a series of 
seemingly interrelated occurrences (Eyerman, 2001, 2011). The resulting discursive 
process can be understood as a meaning struggle, where individual and collective 
actors attempt to define a situation and impose a particular meaning onto it. Within 
this meaning struggle, various individuals and groups construct narratives in which 
trauma is an organizing notion. A central aspect of the cultural trauma process is 
the collective attempt to locate the causes of suffering, to place blame and to point 
to remedies. 
Cultural trauma should be distinguished from the classical and popular notions 
of trauma, which have in common the naturalistic assumption that trauma results 
from a wound inflicted on the body or the mind through an overwhelming event 
which imposes itself on a victim (Alexander, 2004). This naturalistic notion roots 
trauma in a direct individual experience, one that leaves an indelible mark and that 
is the cause of otherwise inexplicable behavior. By contrast, cultural trauma is more 
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contingent and involves discursive practices, collectivities, collective memory and 
collective identity in a struggle to define what is experienced as traumatic (Eyer-
man, 2011, 2015). There can be no doubt that the Vietnam conflict was traumatic 
in the popular and scholarly meaning of the term. The Vietnamese countryside was 
torn apart by violence and death, more than 2 million civilians died and millions 
more were displaced. In addition, about 1.1 million North Vietnamese and Viet 
Cong were killed with many more injured; 58,000 Americans died and thousands 
more wounded (Young, 1991). The Vietnam conflict was both individually and col-
lectively traumatic in the clinical and literal sense of the term (Smelser, 2004). 
The term collective memory refers to the selective and cumulative process 
through which collectivities, from groups to nations, make use and meaningful 
sense of the past. In this we draw upon a tradition in social theory stemming from 
Emile Durkheim and Maurice Halbwachs. Halbwachs (1992) described processes 
through which the past was not merely inscribed in the present through traditions 
and ritual practices as Durkheim (1995) revealed. Instead, he detailed the recollect-
ed “past” as filtered through present needs, most particularly relating to group co-
hesion and social solidarity, another of Durkheim’s central concerns. As we use the 
term, collective memory is intimately bound with identity formation, specifically 
as it related to national or collective identity. We claim that nations develop and de-
pend upon core narratives, mythic accounts of how those who consider themselves 
part of the nation came to be. In constructing the political community that is the na-
tion, including those who are aligned or unaligned with the official state apparatus, 
“agents of memory” selectively draw from a reservoir of images and stories in a 
process of remembering and forgetting. This sometimes occurs with specific aims 
in view, such as the conscious attempt to project a noble image of the collective, 
sometimes it may not be so intentional, but may have the same result. Collective 
memory is thus an active process of meaning-making in which various social forces 
compete. Collective memory can thus be distinguished from history – the profes-
sionalized reconstruction of the past that aims at factual truth. Since it is so tied to 
identity formation and to mobilization, maintaining a living collective memory is a 
distinctly political process, where “collective memory operates as a constraint: by 
proscription (through taboos and prohibition) and by proscription (through duties 
and requirements)” (Olick and Levy, 1997: 923). As a professionalized discourse, 
history-writing has other kinds of constraints, most notably connected to “its me-
thods and through the rules by means of which it leads to verifiable results” (Ko-
selleck, 2004: 94). Of course the two can intersect as academic discussions become 
politicized, something that often happens where traumatic memory and difficult 
pasts are concerned. 
Following Benedict Anderson (1983), Anthony Smith (1991) and Paul Conner-
ton (1989), we conceive of nations as imagined communities, where the construc-
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tion and maintenance of collective identity is both a necessary and ongoing process. 
The existence of core narratives that regulate and inform collective memory implies 
a notion of the past that is non-objective and fluid. Following in the traditions of 
Durkheim and Halbwachs, we understand collective memory as an integral part of a 
more general collective consciousness (Durkheim, 1995; Halbwachs, 1992). Every 
society requires a sense of continuity in order to maintain social cohesion over time, 
and a narrated collective memory that is reinforced through everyday rituals and 
collective events is crucial to that (Connerton, 1989; Misztal, 2003). However, as 
Nora (1996) and Olick (1999) point out, collective memory is a sphere of both con-
sensus and conflict. Memories are contested, as specific events might be represent-
ed and recollected differently by individuals and groups (Tota, 2003; Jordan, 2005). 
This is certainly the case regarding the Vietnam conflict. In contemporary Vietnam 
for example, one finds conflicting representations in local individual/biographical 
narratives, as well as in exile literature. In the United States, former activists in the 
antiwar movement, as well as dissenting veterans, represent and thus remember the 
Vietnam conflict differently from those found in official representations. 
Core national narratives and related ritual practices like holidays and com-
memorations are meant to cement collective identification, as they distinguish “us” 
from “them”, those inside and outside of the collective. The ultimate aim is to se-
cure loyalty to the abstract collectivity we call a nation. The core narratives of na-
tional mythology are transmitted is many ways – in modern societies, through for-
mal means such as school textbooks, reinforced through mundane practices like 
pledges of allegiance and the singing of national anthems at sporting events. Iden-
tification is referenced and reinforced through national days of remembrance, with 
ceremonies arranged at sacred sites on specified dates to enhance their significance. 
National museums are another central mediator of national narratives; this is espe-
cially the case in postwar Vietnam where there has been an organized attempt to 
establish a narrative aimed at unifying the new nation around a shared past that was 
both divisive and traumatic. In this capacity, it is the exiled South Vietnamese that 
have an obvious lack of institutional mediators and influential carriers to establish 
their memory of the war in official discourse. This is especially true in Vietnam 
where their presence as a distinctive oppositional group is all but erased in the effort 
to represent national unity, but also in the United States where the traumatic memo-
ry of the conflict would also make them invisible. There, erecting and dedication of 
the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C. was a long contested process 
whose initial impetus came from the bottom up and not the top down. Its very name 
calls attention to those who served the nation, rather than the cause for which they 
fought. Those Vietnamese who fought and died alongside are not mentioned at all. 
A shared mass culture helps orchestrate and disperse these ritual practices over 
the social, political and geographic boundaries that define the collective. This mass 
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culture and the media that dispense it create a national frame of reference at the 
same time as linking widely dispersed individuals in common conversation. Ander-
son (1983) highlights the daily newspapers that construct and then supply national 
“news” to an audience that intuitively grasps its meaning; to this one could add 
television and social media. Most especially in the United States, the mass media 
helped make Vietnam meaningful for the American public and its role in that pro-
cess remains controversial, as will be discussed below. Electronic mass media did 
not play the same role in Vietnam itself, where older, more traditional forms of re-
presentation and dispersion were relied upon. This was especially true in the North, 
but less so in the South where television and radio did have a significant impact. As 
opposed to the United States, where the existence of a relatively autonomous, com-
mercially-driven, mass media is considered the centerpiece of a democratic way of 
life, popular culture is much more centrally controlled in Vietnam. This too has im-
pacted the way the Vietnam conflict is represented and remembered. 
The War
For the sake of convenience, we locate the origin of the Vietnam War at the end of 
World War II, when the French colonial empire in South East Asia crumbled, impel-
ling the French to fight in order to restore their sovereignty. This marks the begin-
ning of what the Vietnamese call the First Indochina War. This war was understood 
as an anti-colonialist struggle by all parties, part of yet another attempt to form an 
independent nation on the part of the Vietnamese and of national prestige and eco-
nomic gain on the part of the French. On the Vietnamese side, various ethnic, re-
ligious and ideological strands competed to determine what exactly independence 
would imply. Thus, from the perspective of the fractions within the Vietnamese 
leadership the war against the Americans was but another stage in a long strug-
gle against colonial and imperial efforts. The Americans and their European allies 
viewed the matter differently. 
As part of America’s war in Asia, the end of World War II brought about the 
removal of Japanese forces from Vietnam and a concentration of resistance forces 
against the returning French military. France emerged greatly weakened from the 
European war; its military forces had been defeated and half its country occupied by 
the Germans. The attempt to regain some of its colonies in Asia was part of a project 
of national restoration. French weakness provided an opportunity for Vietnamese 
nationalist groups, among them the Viet Minh (League for the Independence of Vi-
etnam), formed in China in 1941 under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. Ho, a Viet-
namese patriot, was also a member of the Communist International. The Viet Minh 
was affiliated with resistance forces operating in all regions of the country dur-
ing World War II. They were supported in this struggle by the United States; there 
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exists a photograph of Ho in a group of smiling uniformed American OSS offi-
cers in a rural campground somewhere in Indochina. The OSS or Office of Strategic 
Services was the precursor of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The Ameri-
cans and Vietnamese rebels had a common enemy in the Japanese. At this point, 
the distinction between north and south Vietnamese was primarily geographical, 
though it did reflect old feudal divisions and cultural differences. Resistance forces 
comprised various groups and ideological factions from all regions of the territory. 
Under President Franklin Roosevelt, the United States was committed to aid-
ing anticolonial struggles, as was the Soviet Union. When Roosevelt died suddenly 
in April 1945, the Soviet Union and the United States were allies sharing this anti-
colonial stance. However, by the time Roosevelt’s successor, his former Vice-Pre-
sident Harry Truman, won re-election in 1948, the situation had changed dramati-
cally, with former allies becoming increasingly at odds. When China came under 
Communist control in 1949, what came to be called the Cold War had escalated in 
confrontation. Truman and his aides abandoned Roosevelt’s anti-colonial stance 
and redefined the struggle in Indochina and Asia generally as part of a conflict be-
tween Communism and the “Free World”. This was made clear in the so-called 
Truman Doctrine of 1947, where a more interventionist policy was put forward. 
In this new worldview, the French were no longer colonialists, but rather an im-
portant European ally in defending democracy, not colonialism, across the globe. 
This division of the world contributed to – and then intensified in – the Korean War 
(1950-1953), which pitted the “Free World” against a monolithic and aggressive 
Communism. The United States explained its actions as purely defensive, aimed at 
containing Communist expansion, along with the defense of a legitimate “democra-
tic” nation-state.2 This was how American intervention in Indochina was under-
stood and legitimated when it was more formally initiated in 1950, the same year 
the Korean War began. This intervention began as financial and military aid to the 
2 It was Truman who established the postwar American military presence in Vietnam when he 
authorized the Military Assistance Advisory Group in September 1950, just months after order-
ing combat troops to Korea. The amount of American military aid would increase dramatically 
after Dwight Eisenhower succeeded Truman in the White House three years later. This marks the 
beginning of what eventually became the Second Indochina War. The First, against the French, 
ended in 1954, with the signing of the Geneva Accords, calling for a ceasefire and a temporary 
division of Vietnam at the 17th parallel. This marked yet another internationally imposed division 
of Vietnam, following traditions established under colonial rule. The Geneva Accords, signed 
by the French, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, China, the Soviet Union and Great Britain, 
called for free elections to be held within two years to determine if the two arbitrarily divided 
regions would be unified or not. The United States never signed this agreement and the elections 
were never held. After a lull, in which refugees were permitted to cross the border in both direc-
tions (including many Catholics moving south), fighting resumed and the Second Indochina War 
began, this time against the Americans.
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French and through them their Vietnamese allies. When the French were defeated 
in 1954, American military “advisors” arrived in increasing numbers during the Ei-
senhower (1953-1961) and Kennedy administrations (1961-1963).
Formally speaking, there never was a Vietnam War as far as the United States 
is concerned. As with the Korean “police action”, no American president asked the 
Congress for a declaration of war, as required by the Constitution. Three presidents 
held office before Lyndon Johnson told the American public their country was en-
gaged in a “real war”. This was pronounced in 1964, as Johnson addressed the na-
tion to justify sending in more ground troops. American forces had been there in 
increasing numbers, but purportedly in an “advisory” and “defensive” role. When 
Johnson left office in 1968 there were 495,000 American soldiers in Vietnam, a 
number that would soon peak at 543,400. The South Vietnamese Army, created and 
trained by the French, wore American made uniforms and fired American weapons. 
Military forces in North Vietnam similarly were trained and supplied by China and 
the Soviet Union; in turn, North Vietnam provided arms and supplies to the South-
ern rebels known as the National Liberation Front (NLF). From the perspective of 
those Vietnamese fighting against the South Vietnamese military, the latter was a 
“puppet” army, with no real standing outside colonialism. On the other side, rela-
tions between the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (the ARVN, alongside of 
which there was a navy and a small air force) and American forces were also prob-
lematic. These relations mirrored those between the government in Saigon and the 
American representatives stationed there; mistrust and misunderstanding was the 
general rule. The reliability of the ARVN and the rooted nature of the government 
vis à vis the Vietnamese population remains to this day a matter of controversy, co-
loring the way the Vietnam conflict is remembered in the Vietnamese diasporas and 
in the United States by historians and politicians. 
The year 1967 was pivotal, with Northern strategy becoming more aggressive 
under the leadership of Le Duan, the General Secretary of the Central Committee, 
while there was growing frustration and dissent on the American side. There was 
internal conflict within the administration between escalating the war and seeking 
an immediate diplomatic solution (Herring, 2001). This was also a presidential elec-
tion year with the war as its central focus. In a bitterly fought election campaign 
in which a leading Democratic candidate (Robert Kennedy) was assassinated and 
the country griped by violence and revolt, Richard Nixon won the presidency on 
the promise of bringing law and order to the country and “Peace with Honor” in 
Vietnam.3 He took office as the North Vietnamese launched their Tet Offensive, at-
3 In one of the closest and most contested elections in American history, Nixon won the popu-
lar vote by a margin of 43.4% – 42.7%, but by a wide margin in the Electoral College. Recent 
documents (available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/31/opinion/sunday/nixons-vietnam-
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tacking all the major cities in the South. This proved to be a turning point, politi-
cally if not in military terms; the war was at its most violent, and antiwar protest 
movements covered the globe and there appeared no clear strategy for victory. In 
response, Nixon and his advisor Henry Kissinger put forward a policy of “Vietnam-
ization”, which included withdrawing American forces from the country and leav-
ing the ground war to the Vietnamese. After the final American withdrawal of com-
bat forces in early 1973, the American government promised continued air support 
and arms and ammunition. In April 1973, South Vietnamese President Thieu visited 
the United States, where President Nixon reiterated his commitment to provide full 
military support. However, in June the American Congress, bolstered by increa-
singly vocal public opposition to the war and a still powerful antiwar movement, 
passed a bill prohibiting any further American involvement in Indochina in a veto-
proof vote. This, combined with the ongoing Watergate scandal, greatly weakened 
the Nixon presidency to the point where it became impossible to provide more than 
minimal backing to Saigon. 
Keenly aware of the situation between the United States and its Vietnamese al-
lies, the North Vietnamese planned their response. Heavy fighting resumed between 
their forces and the ARVN, using American supplied weapons, but with little re-
serves of ammunition and fuel. In August 1974, Richard Nixon resigned in dishonor 
and Gerald Ford assumed the presidency. The next month the Congress drastically 
cut allocations to South Vietnam, creating a severe crisis within the South Vietnam-
ese military. In this context, the North Vietnamese leadership decided to launch a 
full invasion. This began in January 1975. Responding to this, American President 
Ford formally announced that the U.S. would not reenter the conflict. Under the full 
force of attack, a weakened and dispirited ARVN lost major battles in the central 
region of South Vietnam. Following these defeats, President Thieu decided to with-
draw a large proportion of the remaining forces to defend Saigon. Panic and chaos 
ensued. The ARVN’s disarray encouraged and emboldened the North Vietnamese, 
who then decided to continue onto Saigon. Da Nang, South Vietnam’s second lar-
gest city fell in March and over 100,000 troops surrendered, as their commanders 
fled. On April 21, Thieu resigned after a tearful televised speech and shortly there-
after fled the country. On April 30, 1975 Saigon fell, with the last Americans and 
some of their Vietnamese allies leaving by helicopter, in a chaotic exit that was cap-
tured on film and transmitted around the world. These images remain some of the 
most powerful resources shaping the memory of the war. 
treachery.html?&version=readinglist&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-h
eading&module=c-column-middle-span-region&region=c-column-middle-span-region&WT.
nav=c-column-middle-span-region [accessed on 15 September 2016]) reveal how Nixon ma-
nipulated the ongoing peace talks in Paris to increase his advantage in the American election.
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War and Collective Memory: Mobilizing and Commemorating 
More than an imagined community, the nation-state is a collective actor, gather-
ing its members – the nation – in collective projects such as wars, which typically 
are legitimated as the defense of the nation and its interests. The imagined past en-
cased in the narratives congealed as collective memory is called upon to mobilize 
and legitimate such projects. The Vietnam War was a project where the past, most 
especially the heroics of World War II, was mobilized to support present needs by 
all sides. In the United States, major social and political institutions, such as the 
Congress, schools and religious organizations, helped to mobilize the population 
for war. They were supported by various media in popular culture, from Hollywood 
and television to comic books and mass circulation magazines. American youth 
were recruited not only through the selective service administration, popularly ex-
perienced by 18-year-olds and their families as the draft board, but also through 
films and literature that glorified war and patriotic sacrifice. Infused with a Cold 
War view of the world and anxious about a communist threat, politicians, school-
teachers and religious leaders prepared the populace for war against an evil aggres-
sor. The Vietnamese needed no such preparation; their struggle had been ongoing 
for many years, centuries even. Vietnamese youth were drafted in both the north and 
south and mobilized through long-established military traditions. 
The memory of previous wars framed the understanding and guided the ac-
tions of those who planned and participated in the Vietnam conflict. This was es-
pecially the case in Hanoi and Washington, as well as throughout the military or-
ganizations on all sides. The “North” Vietnamese leaders, with Ho Chi Minh as the 
head, saw the war against the Americans as a continuation of the struggle against 
not only the French but more broadly, against China and Japan, as a war of national 
independence. The Americans were yet another foreign power seeking to conquer 
and colonize them and Vietnamese collective memory contained many accounts of 
victory against more powerful enemies. The strategies and tactics of insurgent war-
fare learned from previous struggles guided their efforts, as did the idea of national 
liberation. For them, the “South” Vietnamese were mere puppets, strung along by 
their colonial masters. The South Vietnamese, at least as articulated by intellectuals 
who lived in urban areas like Saigon and for whom the war was largely distant, saw 
themselves as above all “lovers of freedom” and sought to defend themselves from 
what they saw as the brutal dictatorship of communism. Most were as opposed to 
the French colonialism as the communists in the North, but they were equally ill-
disposed toward colonization by communists. They saw their relationship with the 
U.S. as wholly different from that of the French (and Chinese and Japanese); the 
Americans were allies supporting them in their gambit for freedom and independ-
ence. But even so, the South was at the same time wary of the Americans – espe-
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cially as the conflict dragged on and the American presence in the South grew – and 
often felt the need to assert itself against its powerful ally. For the Americans, on the 
other hand, the Vietnam conflict was a stage in the global struggle against Commu-
nist aggression, part of a Cold War in which the Vietnamese were pawns to larger 
forces. Vietnam was merely a place to draw a line. The heroic struggles of World 
War II, against foreign occupation for the Vietnamese, and against the evil of Na-
zism and Fascism for the Americans, was a key factor in the mobilization of collec-
tive memory on all sides. 
While it might have been a shared goal in initiating the conflict, the creation 
of national consciousness and identification was carried out differently in Vietnam 
by forces in the “North” and “South”. State-building and the related issues of loy-
alty and identification were an important project on both sides in what many consi-
dered a civil war. For authorities in Hanoi, the central aim of the struggle was a uni-
fied state and a national consciousness that stretched beyond the boundary created 
in Geneva in 1954 following the defeat of the French. A mythical Vietnamese past 
was a prime force in this project; it had been transmitted over centuries through oral 
traditions and represented in traditional literary and visual art forms, such as poetry 
and graphic arts. The boundaries of the collective to whom this was addressed were 
always fluid, as the idea of “Vietnamese” nation was always abstract and imagined. 
This finally achieved more clarity under colonial rule with the existence of a visible 
common enemy. 
Vietnamese nationalism emerged with full force after World War II, spurred 
on by the return of the French and then by American intervention. Throughout this 
period, the question of the loyalty and identification of those who lived in the now 
divided country, especially in the rural areas of the “south”, was hotly contested. 
Was South Vietnam, its government and its military, merely a French and Ameri-
can creation, or was there something more basic and vital at stake? How strong and 
foundational was identification with South Vietnam and its Saigon-based govern-
ment? Through what means and mechanisms was that imagined community real-
ized? The answer to these questions is still contested among historians and in exile 
communities. During the war, contention over the South Vietnamese government 
and society became the source of great tension between the Saigon-centered lead-
ership and the Americans at crucial moments. At first portrayed as the lone bearer 
of democracy in the region, the autocratic regime of Ngo Dinh Diem (which jailed 
opposition leaders, both political and religious) became increasingly problematic 
after his downfall in 1963, after which no stable, non-military government could 
be established. With the ideological veil of establishing freedom and democracy 
removed, what then were the goals of the American engagement in the conflict? 
The Americans had promoted a massive effort of state-building in South Vietnam, 
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employing social scientists and civil engineers to build political institutions, as well 
as roads and waterways to integrate and govern various parts of the region (Carter, 
2008). This project of creating community occurred alongside the bombing that de-
stroyed it, but its ideological justification, the creation of a democratic society, was 
important to the legitimacy of the project.
Commemorating: Official and Popular Memory
In American academic historiography and also in official discourse the war in Vi-
etnam is now considered “an avoidable mistake” (Dumbrell, 2012). It took close to 
forty years to achieve this degree of consensus in what was almost from the begin-
ning a very contentious debate. Conversely, no such consensus has been reached 
in the political arena. Politicians and policy makers still debate the “lessons” of 
Vietnam and struggle to overcome the “Vietnam syndrome”.4 The memory of Vi-
etnam overshadows ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and other engagements 
in the Middle East, where American leaders debate the consequences of putting 
“boots on the ground” and composing reliable “exit strategies”. There is also the 
post-Vietnam reluctance to engage in warfare because of “the cost to families and 
to public life of the casualties we suffered and inflicted”, which must now be taken 
into account in policy decisions despite the new professional army, which replaced 
the drafting of soldiers from the general population (Sapolsky and Shapiro, 1996: 
122). All this can be traced to the ignoble exit from Vietnam, a ghost that continues 
to haunt the corridors of the American government, especially its military and stra-
tegic policy organizations. This has carried over into official commemorations of 
the war, where the only real consensus concerns celebrating those who served. It is 
perhaps important to point out that from the official point of view, such ceremonies 
are always conditioned by the desire to project an honorable image of the nation. 
This consensus around silence about the causes and consequences of the Viet-
nam War was reflected in the decision to construct a national memorial on the Mall 
in Washington, D.C., the most hallowed ground in the nation. It is not by chance this 
memorial is called the Vietnam Veterans Memorial (1982) and is a memorial, rather 
than a monument. On this commemorative site it is not a war that is commemorated, 
but rather those who died in national service. Although wars have served through-
out history to unify nations, the Vietnam War had the opposite effect. When they 
end victoriously, nations build monuments to commemorate the occurrence and 
memorials to remember those who died even in a lost cause. What monuments and 
memorials have in common is that they offer official recognition, creating sites of 
4 In 1980 presidential candidate Ronald Reagan stated: “For too long, we have lived with the 
Vietnam Syndrome”. In 1991, after the first Gulf War, President George H. Bush effused: “By 
God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all”.
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memory and commemoration. As Arthur Danto (1985: 152) famously observed, 
“we erect monuments so that we shall always remember, and build memorials so 
that we shall never forget”.5 The initiative to erect the Memorial, now one of the 
most visited sites in Washington, D.C., came from the bottom up, from popular 
memory and the efforts of those who served, not from officialdom. This too marks 
the Vietnam War as highly unusual (see Scruggs and Swerdlow (1985) for a per-
sonal history, Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz (1991) for a sociological analysis and 
Sturken (1997) for a humanities approach).6
The project for the memorial was initiated from below, not from the govern-
ment. A former common soldier stimulated by a viewing of The Deer Hunter, a 
popular Vietnam War film produced in 1979, set the process in motion. The film 
evoked strong personal memories and a stubborn desire for collective recognition. 
If nothing else, this reveals the interplay between personal memory, popular culture 
and official memory. This impulse eventually led to an organization of veterans 
who against all odds were successful in their dogged attempts to convince govern-
ment officials to allow a memorial to be erected. The story is movingly told in To 
Heal A Nation by two of the project’s instigators (Scruggs and Swerdlow, 1985). 
The Memorial site on the Washington Mall has become a common place of memory 
for official commemoration as well as popular recollection. 
Like the contested meaning and uses of the Veterans Memorial, the Vietnam 
War still rages in American popular culture and popular imagination. Wars, as 
Nguyen (2016b: 4) has pointed out, are always fought twice, once in the real world 
and then again as fantasy. In liberal societies like the United States, popular culture 
is relatively autonomous from political, religious and commercial attempts to con-
trol what is represented. The word “relatively” is of course important, for, as in all 
wars, the American government and military sought to manage the flow of informa-
5 Sturken (1997: 47) adds this insightful comment: “Monuments are not generally built to com-
memorate defeats; the defeated dead are remembered in memorials. Whereas a monument most 
often signifies victory, a memorial refers to the life or lives sacrificed for a particular set of va-
lues.” 
6 There are many international examples of this however, including several “post-colonial” de-
feats, such as the Dutch in Indonesia and the French in Vietnam and elsewhere. Regarding the 
Dutch/Indonesia example, Scagliola (2007) offers a relevant comment on the difficulties faced 
by Dutch veterans with regard to their traumatic memory of their war: “the fighting took place 
in a far-off and foreign country that can only be visited as a place to mourn and remember by a 
small minority. The memory ‘evaporates’ more easily as it cannot be connected to a specific site. 
Moreover, this ‘foreign’ experience isolates the veteran from the reference frame of his surround-
ing civilian community” (2007: 243). Reflecting on this point, one can better understand the sig-
nificance of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial for veterans and their families. This has become the 
main site of memory, as the graves and battlefields lie far away. 
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tion about the war through the mass media to the greatest degree possible. Given 
that American popular culture is largely commercially driven, control and influence 
were also exerted through corporate ownership. This arena is one of the most im-
portant in the debate over the meaning and memory of the American war in Viet-
nam. Here one can uncover a meaning struggle framed through coded binaries like 
perpetrator/victim, along with attempts to resurrect a heroic narrative of American 
exceptionalism, where its wars are fought to spread freedom and democracy and 
not for material or personal gain. In this, one can find an overlap with official com-
memoration and political discourse, more generally. At the same time, it is largely 
through the medium of popular culture that postwar generations access the Vietnam 
War, in particular through film and literature. 
Within the community arena, biographical and generational factors are signifi-
cant in terms of what is remembered about the Vietnam War. For as long as they re-
main alive, the recollections of what has come to be called the “1960s generation”, 
those who lived through those years, will keep their lived experience of the Viet-
nam War from fading from public view. This generation and most particularly those 
who fought in and for or against the war are the bearers of a distinctive collective 
memory, yet one that is filled with tension stemming from the opposing views of 
the war itself. Formed by the Vietnam War, this generation continues the struggle to 
include its biographical experience into the national story, making corrective claims 
rooted in lived experience against official and popular representations of the war. 
This includes many war veterans, like Tim O’Brien and Oliver Stone, whose novels 
and films continue to shape how new generations remember the war. 
The memory and representation of the American War is less contested in Vi-
etnam than in the United States, as least publicly, where dissention is most often 
posed in terms of the price paid for victory. Putting aside the enormous cost in terms 
of suffering, the war is commemorated as a heroic struggle of national liberation 
and a resilient victory of a people against the greater forces of world powers. This is 
an image that those in authority would like to project and protect. This is reflected 
in the official sites of memory, most particularly state-sponsored museums and the 
reconstructed battlegrounds that have become popular tourist sites particularly for 
American visitors. There is some deep-seated irony to be uncovered here. For the 
diaspora, the loss of a homeland and the creation of a new collective identity guides 
the attempts at reconstructing a collective memory, one that includes the refugee/
immigrant hope for recognition, of having their story included into the national nar-
rative of their new homeland. This construction of collective memory is not without 
guiding interests, as various factions, and generations, struggle to define the collec-
tive in particular ways. 
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With this in mind we can say that each of our protagonists remembers this vio-
lent conflict differently through similar means. Each has different names for the con-
flict, as well as different points of departure and outcomes in this re-telling. While 
April 30, 1975 marked the symbolic end of the American War in Vietnam (“sym-
bolic” because the American combat forces had actually all departed by March 29, 
1973), it is the point of origin in the exiled South Vietnamese narrative of the war. 
The day is commemorated as Black April Day with ceremonies attended by Viet-
namese Americans spread across the United States. It became an official celebration 
in Canada in 2015, but with the name changed to “Journey to Freedom Day”. The 
collapse of its military forces and the fall of Saigon led to a mass exodus of those 
who had allied themselves with the United States. Thousands left immediately with 
the last Americans and many thousands of others exited in the following years, often 
in secret by makeshift boat. They fled to various ports in the region, including Thai-
land, Malaysia and Singapore. More than 280,000 ended up in the United States in 
the postwar period and by 2014 some 1.3 million Vietnamese had immigrated to the 
United States. The early refugees became popularly known as the “boat people” and 
their collective story is only now becoming more generally known (Nguyen, 2016a, 
2016b). The fall of Saigon and the exodus by sea has become the primal scene in 
the formation of a new collective identity born of trauma. Key agents in the articu-
lation of this trauma narrative are the new generations of American-based and edu-
cated Vietnamese. This began with the so-called 1.5 generation, who arrived in the 
United States in their early youth and assimilated into American culture in tension 
with their parents who were more tied to the country they left behind (Lam, 2005, 
2010). While their parents transmitted tales of hardship and resilience, tinged with a 
longing for what was lost, new generations look through the past into an American 
future (Lieu, 2011). In many ways this is a typical immigrant story, but one inten-
sified by the trauma that conditioned it. Arriving on American shores as waves of 
unwanted refugees, the Vietnamese were placed in refugee camps in military bases 
and were not permitted to leave without private sponsorship. It was a humiliating 
experience piled on top of great hardship and loss. Many felt twice betrayed, first 
as an abandoned ally and second as an unwanted guest. As symbolic bearers of a 
lost cause, Vietnamese refugees were as unwelcome as returning American soldiers. 
Out of this beginning, separated from extended family and homeland, they were ex-
pected to carve out a new identity and way of life. Reading the novels and memoirs 
written by first and second generation Vietnamese Americans is a moving experi-
ence, something which now more than forty years later is finally coming to light in 
the broader American society, though it has long been known by Vietnamese Ame-
ricans (Nguyen, 2016a, 2016b, 2017). 
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Conclusion: Memory and Cultural Trauma
In this article we have discussed the potentiality of the traumatic memory generated 
by the Vietnam conflict as it impacted the United States, but also with an eye to the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam (formerly the Democratic Republic of Vietnam) and 
the exiled community of “South” Vietnamese who fled to the USA. Our claim is 
that the Vietnam War was cause for cultural trauma in the United States, as it be-
came a central component in that period of protest and social change known as “the 
Sixties”. Debate, deception, and dissent about that war fractured faith in American 
institutions and raised the issue of what it meant to be a patriotic citizen in a coun-
try that no longer seemed exceptional. As it progressed, the war radically polarized 
the nation contributing to a broad public debate not only about the aims and claims 
of the war, but more fundamentally about what it meant to be an American. This 
fracturing of collective identity was not the case in the Democratic Republic of Vi-
etnam, where what was known as the American War was understood as a war of 
national liberation and thus a continuation of a longer struggle against several ene-
mies. Their project was one of nation-building against the will of foreign interests 
and while traumatic on many levels the struggle resulted in the formation of a new 
collective identity rather than its fracturing, even as it is a collective memory which 
consciously excludes those who stood in opposition. This trauma might better be 
described as collective rather than cultural in our sense of these terms. In terms 
of collective memory the war was traumatic, given its longevity and long-lasting 
impact. Yet, when measured in terms of collective identity and social cohesion, it 
was not traumatic for the victors at least, though it did and still does raise difficult 
questions of a foundational nature, which linger on in terms of internal conflict re-
garding former enemies. The South Vietnamese (and some Americans) on the other 
hand who defined the situation as a civil war, could also make claims of nation-
building, but of quite a different sort. Their individual and collective trauma erupted 
as cultural trauma after their war was lost and they entered a forced and, for many, 
an unwelcoming diasporic existence.
The experience of the trauma was thus different for our three protagonists. For 
the victorious Vietnamese rebels it was part of the continuing violent struggle for 
liberation from foreign domination; at the same time it helped ground a new collec-
tive identity rooted in old (Vietnamese) and new (Communist) traditions. This pro-
cess is still ongoing, as it has currently been modified to include reconciliation with 
the United States and inclusion into the “Western” orbit. For the “South” Vietnam-
ese, trauma was intensified with the loss of a homeland and the necessity to forge 
a new identity on foreign soil. This process too is ongoing. Along with much else, 
it involves an intense generational confrontation, as those born in Vietnam strug-
gle to maintain a sense of the “old country” and its traditions, while their children 
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look forward to establishing themselves in their new surroundings. This struggle for 
identification is entwined with a struggle for acceptance and recognition, something 
which might equally apply to the new unified (at least formally) Vietnamese nation 
on a more global scale. 
As a discursive process, cultural trauma requires articulation and carrier groups 
that bear the burden of its representation. One can identify such groups for each of 
our three protagonists. Those who actually fought the war, the various categories 
of veterans, from military to policy and administrative officials, are central in all 
three. They and their generation carry the trauma most personally and are the most 
active in its representation, particularly in the political arena and popular culture, 
where many have objectified their biographical experiences in published memoirs, 
novels and films. This is especially the case for Americans and for the first and 
second generations of Vietnamese Americans for whom popular culture is an im-
portant medium of individual and collective expression. They are becoming an in-
creasingly visible voice of the war to an American public that has only known one 
side. The situation in Vietnam is different where popular culture has been more 
tightly regulated. This has been changing since the 1980s however with liberali-
zation as well as the interaction with the exile community, including an emergent 
group of artists and intellectuals, some of whom move between Vietnam and the 
United States, who may offer counter narratives of the war and its meaning. 
A central aspect of the cultural trauma process is the collective attempt to lo-
cate the causes of suffering, to place blame and to point to remedies. These take 
a narrative form and are constructed by carrier groups using different media and 
frames of reference to address diverse audiences in various arenas. One can find 
significant differences in form and content across our three protagonists. In the 
United States where organized protest and political opposition is an inherent part of 
what Americans mean by democracy, social movements play a central role in con-
structing arguments against the war. Antiwar protesters sat in on college campus-
es and were joined by their professors and other professionals, including religious 
leaders, in denouncing the strategies and tactics of the war. Through representative 
figures like Martin Luther King, Jr. there was interplay between the vibrant Civil 
Rights movement and this antiwar movement, bringing Vietnam to the attention 
of a wide range of Americans and exerting great pressure on political leaders and 
policy makers. Especially after the Tet Offensive of 1968, journalists used the mass 
media to report on the negative sides of the war in a way that might not have been 
possible elsewhere. There was also widespread opposition to the war among artists, 
playwrights, authors, musicians and other intellectuals, who made use of their vari-
ous media and popular culture generally to protest the war and to name and confront 
those they deemed responsible for it. Other American institutions, the courts and the 
Congress became vehicles for protest and challenge.
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 54, No. 1-2, 2017, pp. 11-31
28
The situation is different in Vietnam, where the cause of pain and suffering was 
more clear and indisputable and its source more easy to identify: the foreign ene-
my of colonialists and their surrogates. Whether or not the American soldiers and 
their allies fell into the latter category was a matter of dispute, but they clearly were 
foreign. How this could be remedied was less clear. Without the long established 
democratic traditions of the United States, many Vietnamese rallied around Ho Chi 
Minh and the organized opposition his leadership provided against foreign occupa-
tion, including the Chinese, Japanese and of course the French. When the Ameri-
cans entered the picture there was little difficulty in painting them with the same 
brush. This narrative was diffused through oral and visual means during the war and 
put in practice through field indoctrination by cadres working among the peasantry. 
Vietnamese artists, poets and songwriters were active agents in this process, as they 
were recruited into the armed struggle. The viewpoint of the “South” Vietnamese 
was more ambiguous. Some viewed Ho as much a nationalist as a communist, or 
supported other nationalist movements or groups and thus viewed the American 
“advisors” with suspicion, if not animosity. Others were more strongly in favor of 
the American presence, though perhaps with the idea that this was something less 
permanent and dominating than colonial occupation. Such views were formulated 
by urban elites and expressed through tightly controlled mass media and reinforced 
through the military and political parties whose interplay and relative power va-
ried over the course of the conflict. In the end, there was little distinction between 
the military and political in “South” Vietnam. The views of the rural population, the 
great majority in all regions of Vietnam, are less clear as they had little access to any 
and all forms of media and organization beyond their local communities. 
Postwar Vietnam is quite different, especially with the current liberalizing 
trends gaining ground and the strategy of becoming a regional power more closely 
allied with the West. The current population, though still largely rural and poor, is 
greatly weighted toward youth and there is a strong incentive to look forward rather 
than back. Literacy rates are exceptionally high, 94% for adults over 24 years of 
age though lower for minorities and women.7 More than 80% of urban households 
own a television and the several government-run channels are available even in re-
mote areas.8
Newspapers of various shades of opinion are available and the internet, though 
censored, has also introduced a range of viewpoints and services to the country.9 
The Vietnamese seem to have put the American war behind them, especially since 
7 http://www.unesco.org/uil/litbase/?menu=14&programme=57 [accessed on 15 October 2016].
8 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam_Television [accessed on 15 October 2016].
9 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_censorship_in_Vietnam [accessed on 15 October 2016].
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other, more regionally based wars have intervened. With the flow of tourists and the 
return of diasporic Vietnamese, there is a vibrant urban and urbane popular culture 
emerging that is outside the direct control of the state. America is no longer an en-
emy, but a trading partner and potential ally. The memory of the American War is 
fixed in museums and memorials, living memory for an older generation, but less 
and less so for the majority of the population. That trauma has largely passed into 
history, even as it lives on in natural landscape where the effects of chemical and 
other forms of warfare are present. These are the scars of collective memory, rather 
than the open wound of cultural trauma.
Our analysis has shown that collective memory is a living force in the life of in-
dividuals and the societies in which they are embedded. Collective memory shapes 
the way individuals and groups understand themselves, affecting their understand-
ing of who they are and why they act as they do. It is also the case that groups at-
tempt to control how they are collectively remembered (De Keizer, 1996). This 
is especially the case with regard to those who experience at first hand traumatic 
events like war, where an entire generation may be shaped by such experience. 
The Vietnam conflict was formative to such generational consciousness, which in 
part explains why it remains alive and contested. But this conflict had a wider im-
pact than that of a generation, at least in the United States, where the war is still a 
point of emotional contestation. This is especially true for those Vietnamese who 
fled their former country and now live there. The memory of the Vietnam conflict 
significantly shaped their thoughts and actions beyond those who experienced it. 
How long this will remain the case is an open question, which is contingent upon 
the forces of assimilation and relations between Vietnam and the United States. The 
memory of Vietnam remains a forceful presence in several major American institu-
tions, most prominently those related to military and foreign policy affairs where 
institutional memory has a longer lifespan than in popular culture. Even in the latter 
however, interest in the Vietnam War is continually revived through new wars and 
new voices, such as those of Vietnamese Americans who until now had little pre-
sence. The desire to “put Vietnam behind us”, to relegate it to history as a “tragic 
event”, to “move on” is strongly felt, but has not yet been satisfied. Vietnam is a war 
Americans would like to forget, but cannot.
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